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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 17-2110

DELILAH A. GRAHAM-SMITH;
RODNEY G. SMITH,
Appellants
v.
WILKES-BARRE POLICE DEPARTMENT;
CITY OF WILKES-BARRE;
ALAN GRIBBLE, In His Individual Capacity;
GERARD E. DESSOYE, In His Official and Individual Capacities

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No.: 3:14-cv-2159)
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley

Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on January 18, 2018
(Opinion filed: June 28, 2018)

Before: AMBRO, RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
O P I N I O N*

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.

FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellants Delilah Graham-Smith and Rodney G. Smith appeal the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment on their claim of excessive force in favor of
Defendants-Appellees City of Wilkes-Barre and police officer Alan Gribble, in his
individual capacity. For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s
decision.
I.
Because we write for the parties, we include only those facts relevant to the
disposition of the case before us.
Graham-Smith was involved in a car accident with another automobile on the
morning of November 12, 2012. Graham-Smith acted “nervous and agitated” at the
scene of the accident.1 She crossed the street to go to Luzerne Bank, though GrahamSmith disputes that her conduct constitutes the Pennsylvania misdemeanor of leaving the
scene of an accident. In the bank, Graham-Smith was visibly shaken and upset.
Gribble, a police officer, arrived at the scene of the accident approximately six
minutes later. After speaking with the driver of the other car involved in the accident,
Gribble learned that Graham-Smith had left the scene. He determined that GrahamSmith was the owner of the other car, and eventually arrived at the bank. Gribble ordered
Graham-Smith to return to the scene of the accident, but she did not.

1

App. 40a ¶ 25.
2

When deposed, Gribble testified that Graham-Smith told him on previous
occasions that she had “psychiatric issues,”2 and was “on some medication or
medications.”3 However, none of these medications were for psychiatric treatment.
Gribble testified that he believed Graham-Smith was “not speaking rationally,”4 and that
her agitation was escalating to a point where he believed she might harm herself or
someone else.
Police officers in Wilkes-Barre, including Gribble, are required to complete 40
annual hours of training related to their professional responsibilities, which includes
training on when to petition for mental health examinations. During his interaction with
Graham-Smith at the bank, Gribble believed it was necessary to take Graham-Smith to
the hospital for a mental health examination. Graham-Smith refused to leave her chair
when prompted by Gribble, and wrapped herself around the chair. Gribble pulled her
thumb back to get Graham-Smith out of the chair, which Graham-Smith admits was in
compliance with the Wilkes-Barre Police Department’s Use of Force Policy. He
handcuffed her and removed her from the bank. There are disputes regarding whether
Gribble’s actions in removing Graham-Smith from the bank fell under the Use of Force
Policy. Graham-Smith complained about the tightness of the handcuffs, and it is disputed
whether Gribble examined the handcuffs in response.
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App. 39a ¶ 14.
App. 39a ¶ 15; ¶ 108a.
4
App. 43a ¶ 41; ¶ 122a.
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Gribble transported Graham-Smith to the hospital, where she was involuntarily
committed for a mental health evaluation. Medical professionals determined she did not
require psychiatric treatment. She was given pain medication at the hospital. Nearly two
years later, in October 2014, Graham-Smith saw a doctor for pain and loss of sensation in
her hands, which she associated with Gribble’s use of handcuffs. The physician noted
that Graham-Smith had been involved in a motor vehicle accident as well. This doctor
ordered an electromyogram to assess Graham-Smith’s nerves for ulnar compression
neuropathy or carpal tunnel syndrome. The results of this exam are not in the record, nor
was the physician deposed, but according to Graham-Smith the doctor assessed GrahamSmith to have carpal tunnel syndrome. Graham-Smith was never charged with
misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment and apply the same standard as the District Court.5
Summary judgment is appropriate if and only if there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.6 The evidence must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 7 “We do not weigh the evidence;

5

Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
7
Kelly, 622 F.3d at 253.
6
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rather we determine ‘whether the evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”8 We may affirm on any basis in the record.9
III.
Graham-Smith brought three claims against the City and Gribble upon which
summary judgment was granted: unlawful seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, false
imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On
appeal, Graham-Smith only challenges the grant of summary judgment on the excessive
force claim. Because summary judgment in favor of the City and Gribble was
appropriate for this claim, we will affirm.
A.
A claim for excessive force derives from the Fourth Amendment, and “a plaintiff
must show that a ‘seizure’ occurred and that it was unreasonable under the
circumstances.”10 This is not an evaluation on the reasonableness of the underlying
arrest, but on the reasonableness of the use of force exerted in the course of the seizure.11
“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of
a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”12

8

Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 467 (3d Cir. 2016).
Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937) (“In the review of judicial proceedings
the rule is settled that, if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the
lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.”).
10
Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 182–83 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Brower v. Cty. of
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989)).
11
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
12
Id. at 396.
9
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“[T]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of
precise definition or mechanical application . . . .”13 “The calculus of reasonableness
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make splitsecond judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”14 “[I]ts proper
application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular
case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [s]he is actively resisting arrest
or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”15 These circumstances include the severity of
injury resulting from the force used, though the absence of injury does not legitimize
otherwise excessive force.16
Here, it is beyond material dispute that Gribble’s use of force was reasonable as a
matter of law under the totality of the circumstances. The reasonableness inquiry
requires us to assess the conduct at issue for “reasonableness at the moment,” recognizing

13

Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
Id. at 396–97.
15
Id. at 396.
16
See Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997) (“We do not agree that the
absence of physical injury necessarily signifies that the force has not been excessive,
although the fact that physical force was of such an extent as to lead to injury is indeed a
relevant factor to be considered as part of the totality.”), abrogated on other grounds by
Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 209–11 (3d Cir. 2007); cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 674 (1977) (“There is, of course, a de minimis level of imposition with which the
Constitution is not concerned.”); Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 778 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004)
(distinguishing cases where use of force or resulting injury were de minimis).
14
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that “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a
judge’s chambers . . . violates the Fourth Amendment.”17
It is not disputed that Graham-Smith refused to comply with Gribble’s direction to
return to the scene of the accident, or that she took physical measures to prevent Gribble
from arresting her or removing her from the bank. Although Graham-Smith disputes here
that this constitutes resisting arrest under the enumerated considerations of Graham’s
reasonableness inquiry, a reasonable officer would certainly view wrapping oneself
around a chair to prevent being moved as resistance.
The dispute as to Gribble’s conduct in removing Graham-Smith from the bank
after handcuffing her is immaterial: assuming that Gribble did in fact “run” GrahamSmith out of the bank while forcing Graham-Smith’s hands towards her head, that use of
force was reasonable within the Fourth Amendment. Although the severity of the
underlying crime of arrest was mild and the circumstances of the arrest were relatively
benign, Gribble was required to remove Graham-Smith from the bank. With respect to
this conduct specifically, Graham-Smith has not adduced sufficient evidence to connect
this conduct to the injuries she alleges, though that is not dispositive. Graham-Smith has
not adduced sufficient evidence to create a material dispute as to the reasonableness of
this conduct. We do not determine that Gribble’s use of force was ideal or even the
minimal force necessary when viewed in hindsight: those determinations are beyond the

17

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
7

scope of the legal inquiry. We only hold that a reasonable officer in the moment could
have conducted himself similarly.
Finally, Graham-Smith contends that the handcuffs restraining her were
excessively tight, leading to injury. There is a dispute as to whether Gribble examined
the handcuffs in response to Graham-Smith’s complaints of wrist pain and tight
handcuffs, so we resolve that dispute in favor of Graham-Smith and assume that Gribble
did not examine the handcuffs. Graham-Smith has not adduced sufficient evidence to
create a material dispute as to whether Gribble handcuffed her excessively and
unreasonably tightly. Kopec v. Tate held that the reasonableness of tight handcuffing
presents a question for the jury where the resulting injuries required over a year of
treatment from a hand surgeon.18 In doing so, it discussed the persuasive authority of our
sister Circuits holding that the reasonableness of tight handcuffing did not raise a
question of fact for the jury where the resulting injury was de minimis.19
As discussed previously, excessive force is not determined by injury alone.
However, the unreasonableness of handcuffing requires some indication that it was done
unnecessarily or excessively. In Kopec, which specifically notes that “this opinion
should not be overread as we do not intend to open the floodgates to a torrent of handcuff
claims,”20 the totality of circumstances put the arresting officer on notice that the force
employed was excessive. These circumstances included specific complaints that the

18

Kopec, 361 F.3d at 774, 776.
Id. at 778 n.7 (collecting and discussing cases).
20
Id. at 777.
19
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arrestee was losing feeling in his hand as well as the arrestee falling to the ground and
beginning to faint.21 Here, the signs of excess were limited to Graham-Smith’s
complaints that the handcuffs were hurting her and were cutting her wrists. GrahamSmith has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to create a material dispute as to whether
actual injury resulted from the handcuffs beyond superficial lacerations. The only
evidence in the record regarding subsequent medical treatment is a report from a treating
physician approximately twenty-three months after the incident. This report does not
opine as to the cause of Graham-Smith’s expressed symptoms, only noting that she
complained of pain “secondary to an arrest with offensively placed handcuffs,” and that
she was involved in a motor vehicle accident.22 This establishes only that Graham-Smith
sought treatment and was referred for assessment via electromyogram: we cannot
reasonably infer either the cause of her pain or the results of the ordered test from the
report in the record. Without sufficient evidence to establish a dispute as to the
excessiveness or unreasonableness of Gribble’s handcuffing of Graham-Smith, there
exists no question of fact for a jury to decide.
Because Graham-Smith failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a dispute
of material fact in this case, the District Court properly granted summary judgment on her
claim for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

21
22

Id. at 774.
App. 206a–207a.
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B.
Graham-Smith also contends that Gribble is not entitled to qualified immunity on
her excessive force claim. The District Court held that Gribble is entitled to qualified
immunity. We agree. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense designed to “protect
government officials from insubstantial claims in order to ‘shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’” 23
“When properly applied, it protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.’”24 It prohibits a plaintiff from recovering money damages
against a federal or state official unless a plaintiff shows “(1) that the official violated a
statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time
of the challenged conduct.”25
As discussed above, Graham-Smith has not established the violation of any of her
constitutional rights by Gribble’s reasonable use of force. Therefore, Gribble is entitled
to qualified immunity.
C.
Because Graham-Smith has not adduced sufficient evidence to establish a dispute
of material fact that her constitutional rights were violated, summary judgment is

23

Mammaro v. New Jersey Div. of Child Protection and Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 168
(3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).
24
Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986)).
25
Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
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likewise appropriate on her claim against the city for municipal liability under Monell v.
Dep’t of Social Servs.26
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.

26

436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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